



(U) CHINA: PLAA COMBINED-ARMS BRIGADE'S LOGISTICS OPERATIONS

(U) This infographic describes and depicts PLAA Army (PLAA) Combined Arms-Brigade (CA-BDE) Logistics Operations. China desires to have military might with the ability to project a force in order to meet the PRC's interest. The PLA's ability to project force within and beyond China's borders depends on adequate logistics capabilities, systems, and policies. The PLA has modernized their logistics capabilities at all echelons and established the Joint Logistics Support Force (PLAJLSF) as a service-level organization to manage it. The PLAJLSF is a force in transition, both the inheritor of decades of investments in logistics modernization and recent upgrades, but also a new and largely untested force with several apparent weaknesses.

(U) The PLA's new expeditionary requirements place strain on limited maintenance and logistics resources. Solutions to these capability gaps are currently in the conceptual and testing phase, but have yet to be widely implemented. PLAA logistics and armament troops may struggle to sustain heavy armored forces over long distances or for an extended period of time.

(U) PLAA COMBINED ARMS BRIGADE (U) CA-BDE LOGISTICS ASSETS

-  **Medium CA-BDE**
5,000 x Troops
-  30 x IFVs
-  14 x 105-mm assault guns
-  6-9 x rapid-fire 120-mm mortars/MANPADS/Crew-served wpns
-  18-27 x 122/155-mm Self-propelled Gun
-  9 x 122-mm Rocket Artillery
-  9 x ATGM
-  18 x SPAAG
-  8 x SHORAD
-  1-2 x Radar Systems
-  12-20 x light armored vehicles
-  2-3 x UAS
-  Operational Support (Signals/Engineers/CBRN)
- Service Support (Logistics/Maintenance/Transport/Medical)

(U) TYPE 05 ARMORED BREACHING VEHICLE





(U) TYPE 08 ARMORED VEHICLE-LAUNCHED BRIDGE




(U) UAV FOR AERIAL DELIVERY



(U) Used in a war-time setting, PLAA CA-BDE are training to delivery critical supplies up to approximately 20km away via UAS.



(U) CA-BDE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN THE RESERVE ZONE OR REAR DEFENSE ZONE



The CA-BDE's **Service Support Battalion** provides sustainment support for the CA-BDE, including supply, medical, and maintenance support. It is unclear if the service support battalion operates in a more traditional and centralized manner, or if it habitually task-organizes itself to support individual CA-BNs

(U) The PLAA CA-BDE has two support units: an operational support and a service support battalion. In the offense, they are located in the garrison zone. In the defense, they support from the rear defense zone.

(U) The CA-BDE's operational support battalion provides mobility, countermobility, and protection capabilities, along with an EW company, a command and communication company, a chemical defense company, and a security (military police) company. It is similar, but not identical, to the U.S. Army's special troops battalion. The operational support battalion likely operates in a highly decentralized manner, task-organizing support elements to other battalions within the CA-BDE. Operational support battalions are tailored to the needs of their parent unit; heavier CA-BDEs require heavier engineer support. One of the most important missions of the operational support battalion is supporting deception operations. The PLAA puts a very high priority on camouflage and concealment, and much of this responsibility falls to the engineering element of the operational support battalion. The operational support battalion also employs a relatively high density of vehicles, representing a significant portion of the CA-BDE's wheeled-vehicle inventory..

(U) The CA-BDE's service support battalion provides sustainment support for the CA-BDE, including supply, medical, and maintenance support. It is likely structured similarly to the US Army's brigade support battalion. It is unclear if the service support battalion operates in a more traditional and centralized manner, or if it habitually task-organizes itself to support individual CA-BNs. To support the CA-BN concept, greater logistics decentralization will likely occur, but PLAA logistics infrastructure may not support this approach without significant augmentation..

References: